The Ultimate and the Penultimate: Bonhoeffer's Two-fold Contextualism and Adjudicating Between Competing Ethical Claims by W. Travis McMaken
  
 
 
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY 
 
 
 
 
THE ULTIMATE AND THE PENULTIMATE: BONHOEFFER’S TWO-FOLD 
CONTEXTUALISM AND ADJUDICATING BETWEEN COMPETING ETHICAL CLAIMS 
 
 
 
SUBMITTED TO DR NANCY J. DUFF 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  
ET 920: TYPES OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
W. TRAVIS MCMAKEN 
MAY 8, 2008 
 
 1
 
THE ULTIMATE AND THE PENULTIMATE: BONHOEFFER’S TWO-FOLD 
CONTEXTUALISM AND ADJUDICATING BETWEEN COMPETING ETHICAL CLAIMS 
 
The life and work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer was quick to capture the imagination of theologians, 
clergy, and lay Christians in the years following the Second World War.  His brave and 
theologically reflective involvement in the Abwehr plot to overthrow Hitler, and the untimely 
end he met as a result of that involvement, commended him to any Christian interested in 
bringing their Sunday faith with them to work and public service on Monday.  Furthermore, his 
Discipleship offered a fresh perspective on communal spirituality attractive to many clergy and 
laypeople, and his Letters and Papers from Prison became important – perhaps wrongly – for 
theologians interested in the death of God.  The Ethics, however, languished until the early 
1980s, when a new wave of Bonhoeffer research began that focused on determining the proper 
chronological arrangement of the Ethics fragments.1   
When seen against this background, it is interesting that one of the earliest 
substantial treatments of Bonhoeffer’s ethical thought would finally be critical of it.  Larry 
Rasmussen argued already in the early 1970s that Bonhoeffer’s ethical thought is inadequate 
insofar as it provides no framework for adjudicating between “different claims to Christian 
ethics, all of which assert that they bring to expression the will of God.”2  Furthermore, 
Rasmussen attributes this inadequacy not to the fragmentary and incomplete nature of 
Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, but to its central motifs or, as Rasmussen puts it, “the most fundamental and 
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 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Clifford J. Green, trans. Richard Krauss, Charles C. West, and Douglas 
W. Stott, vol. 6, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005), Appendix 2 ("Preparing the 
German Edition of 'Ethics,'" Ilse Tödt), 467.   
 
2
 Larry L. Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Reality and Resistance, Studies in Christian Ethics (Nashville, 
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most continuous elements.”3  It is the contention of this paper – contra Rasmussen – that the two-
fold contextualism of Bonhoeffer’s ethical thought provides adequate grounds for adjudication 
between competing ethical claims while also preserving the ethical freedom of the Christian 
individual before God.  While this paper does not respond to Rasmussen on a point-by-point 
basis, it presents an account of the central themes or logic of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, illustrated by 
his engagement with the ethical question of self-inflicted death, that finally mitigates 
Rasmussen’s claim.   
 
PARSING THE LOGIC OF BONHOEFFER’S ETHICS 
The Ethics is not a unified treatise, nor even disparate chapters from what would be a unified 
treatise were it completed.  Rather, it is comprised of various exploratory beginnings and angles 
of attack for the work that Bonhoeffer intended to write.4  This makes it difficult to get at the 
kernel of Bonhoeffer’s ethical thought in the Ethics and its internal logic, but such a task is not 
impossible.  It does mean, however, that thoughts must often be traced across multiple essays 
and that, while each essay deserves careful scrutiny in its own right, a more comprehensive and 
synthetic vision is needed.  Consequently, this paper’s treatment will proceed thematically and 
not chronologically, although the two sequences occasionally align.  
 One of Bonhoeffer’s pivotal aims in his Ethics is the reclamation of Luther’s two-
kingdoms doctrine from what he understands to be improper use and interpretation.  It is clear in 
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 For a helpful discussion of these “fresh starts,” see Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Man of Vision, 
Man of Courage, ed. Edwin Robertson, trans. Eric Mosbacher, et al. (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 622-6. 
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this regard that “Bonhoeffer styles himself the true Lutheran.”5  This concern arises in 
Bonhoeffer’s first essay, “Christ, Reality, and God.”  Instead of understanding church and world 
as two realms that are – and ought to be kept – separate, Bonhoeffer argues that these two realms 
are inextricably united in Christ.  To treat them as separate would be to grant the world 
independence from God, and Bonhoeffer’s christology will not countenance such a concession: 
“The world has no reality of its own independent of God’s revelation in Christ…there are not 
two realms, but only the one realm of the Christ-reality.”6  It is important to establish the point 
that it is the world grounded in and interpreted by Christ to which Bonhoeffer refers when he 
speaks of reality.   
Just as Christ is revealed to be the ontological foundation of the world, the 
incarnation also means that “God is to be found in the midst of the world and nowhere else.”7  
Jesus Christ in his fully human and fully divine existence represents an intimate relation between 
God and the world, a unity that “established in Christ…realizes itself again and again.”8  This 
does not mean that such realization is brought about by human efforts.  But it is because of this 
unity, established in Christ and continually realized by Christ, that Bonhoeffer cannot conceive 
of Christian existence apart from engagement with the world: “Belonging completely to Christ, 
one stands at the same time completely in the world” because “there is no real Christian 
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existence outside the reality of the world.”9  There simply is no Christian existence distinct from 
the world, although there is a particularly Christian understanding of the world, namely, as 
having its reality grounded in Jesus Christ.   
Bonhoeffer goes on to consider the relation of Christ to the world, and therefore 
of the Christian to the world, in his fifth essay, “Ultimate and Penultimate Things.”  For 
Bonhoeffer, the world’s reality as established and revealed in Christ is the ultimate.  The 
penultimate is the world as conceived apart from Christ, either as temporally preceding Christ’s 
advent or as persisting in the stage of already-but-not-yet after that advent and until the parousia.  
The central question here is this: How are the ultimate and the penultimate related?   
There are two inadequate ways of conceptualizing this relation.  The first, “radical 
solution” is to see “only a complete break with the penultimate” where “Christ is the destroyer 
and enemy of everything penultimate and everything penultimate is the enemy of Christ.”10  
Understanding the relation between ultimate and penultimate in this radical way emphasizes 
Christ’s judgment, and Bonhoeffer rightly recognizes that such an emphasis on the ultimate can 
lead to a lack of concern for the penultimate.  If Christ is all, the logic might go, then all else is 
nothing.  Or, as Bonhoeffer puts it in more colorful language, “The world must burn in any 
case.”11  Here, judgment reigns and grace is lost.  Second, there is the compromise solution, 
where the ultimate makes no claim upon the penultimate and the penultimate “retains its inherent 
rights…[and] is not threatened or endangered by the ultimate.”12  Understanding the relation 
between ultimate and penultimate in this radical way emphasizes Christ’s mercy, and Bonhoeffer 
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rightly recognizes that such maintenance of the penultimate against the ultimate can lead to a 
bracketing off of the ultimate from the penultimate.  The result would be the sort of thing 
Bonhoeffer was protesting against in his attempted reclamation of Luther’s two-kingdom 
doctrine, namely, the sort of Christian existence that fails to engage with the world.  Worse still, 
it could be that the ultimate would finally serve – as it did in German Christianity – “as an 
eternal justification of all that exists.”13  Here, grace reigns and judgment is lost.   
 These two inadequate conceptions of the relation between ultimate and 
penultimate do not result from failing to think about that relation out of a center in Jesus Christ.  
Parallel to Bonhoeffer’s reclamation of Luther’s two-kingdom’s doctrine, Jesus Christ is the 
keystone in both these conceptions.  Neither of them, then, violate Bonhoeffer’s dictum, “The 
relationship between the ultimate and the penultimate is resolved only in Christ.”14  What these 
inadequate conceptions are, however, is reductive in their understandings of Christ.  They do not 
hold together Christ’s incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection in their proper unity.  Instead, 
they absolutize one of these aspects and neglect the others.  Bonhoeffer himself spells this out:  
“A Christian ethic built only on the incarnation would lead easily to the compromise solution; an 
ethic built only on the crucifixion or only on the resurrection of Jesus Christ would fall into 
radicalism and enthusiasm.  The conflict is resolved in their unity.”15  
It is only by considering Christ in the unity of incarnation, cross, and resurrection 
that the proper relation of ultimate to penultimate can be discerned.  This tri-fold elucidation of 
Christ’s work is something to which Bonhoeffer returns frequently.  It is elaborated briefly in 
“Ultimate and Penultimate Things,” but he treats it more clearly in “Ethics as Formation” 
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through an elaboration of the Latin translation of Pilate’s exhortation in John 19.5, Ecco homo – 
behond the man.  First, we behold Jesus Christ as God incarnate, the embodiment of God’s love 
for the world.  What is more, God unites Godself not to ideal humanity in the incarnation but 
“takes on human nature as it is” in its sinfulness.16  In this we see that God loves humanity in all 
its sin and weakness, not humanity as ideally conceived.  Second, we behold in the cross of Jesus 
Christ the reconciling judgment of God.  Peace between God and humanity, and among 
humanity, can only be achieved “by executing God’s judgment on God,” which is accomplished 
because of “the love of God for the world, for human beings.”17  Furthermore, because we are 
included in Christ the judgment and reconciliation with God that he experienced is ours as well.  
This is a scandal to worldly eyes in that it is only by death (judgment) that we can live 
(reconciliation).  Third, we behold in Jesus Christ the risen one.  There is not only death, but also 
resurrection.  New life has arrived.  While it is true that the penultimate persists, we are 
ultimately beyond it in Jesus Christ.  As Bonhoeffer says, “In Jesus Christ, the one who became 
human was crucified and is risen; humanity has become new…The new human being has been 
created.”18  
The pattern here is that God affirms God’s love for the penultimate – humanity 
and the world as it is separated from God in sin – in the incarnation, God judges the penultimate 
in the crucifixion, and God inaugurates a new mode of existence that moves beyond the 
penultimate without destroying it in the resurrection.  After all, it is only in light of the ultimate 
that the penultimate becomes penultimate.  And, Bonhoeffer argues, the penultimate is and “must 
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be preserved for the sake of the ultimate.”19  The notion is that the penultimate created world 
must exist if human beings are going to come to faith in the ultimate, Jesus Christ.  Christians are 
called to this work of preservation or, as Bonhoeffer more consistently calls it with allusion to 
Isaiah 40 and Matthew 3, ‘preparing the way.’  This preparatory task is not in any sense a work 
of making grace a possibly.  Bonhoeffer is insistent that, “Grace must finally clear and smooth its 
own way; it alone must again and again make the impossible possible.”20  But, what we can do – 
Bonhoeffer insists – is remove penultimate obstacles to its coming.  The pivotal insight here is 
that, as Liguš puts it, circumstances of “desolation, poverty, exploitation, oppression, and 
hunger…make it nearly impossible to believe in God’s justice and might.”21  The goal, then, is 
not to bring about the ultimate through our all too human and penultimate activity, but to – as 
best as we are able – establish conditions in the penultimate realm that oppose the ultimate as 
little as possible.  This work is, to be sure, a relative measure: the penultimate remains sinful and 
estranged from God apart from the present and activity of Christ.  Still, it is not a matter of no 
concern that the penultimate correspond relatively more than less to the ultimate. 
In Jesus Christ God became incarnate, was crucified, and was resurrected.  This 
both established and revealed the relation between the penultimate world conceived apart from 
Christ and the ultimate reconciliation and new life of that world with God achieved by Christ.  
As those awakened to the ultimate, Christians are to care for and preserve the penultimate in its 
integrity as that which is loved by and reconciled to God.  Bonhoeffer sums things up nicely 
when he writes, “To give the hungry bread is not yet to proclaim to them the grace of God and 
                                                 
19
 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 160.  
 
20
 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 162. 
 
21
 Ján Liguš, "Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Ultimate, Penultimate and Their Impact," in Bonhoeffer's Ethics: Old 
Europe and New Frontiers, ed. Guy Carter, et al. (Kampen, The Netherlands: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1991), 
64. 
 8
justification, and to have received bread does not yet mean to stand in faith,” rather, it is to do 
“something penultimate for the sake of the ultimate.”22  
This understanding of the relation that obtains between ultimate and penultimate 
calls church and Christian to an existence characterized by freedom and responsibility, which 
Bonhoeffer discusses in his second essay on “History and Good.”  It is of vital import, however, 
to identify the whence and whither of this freedom and responsibility.  Responsibility is a life 
“lived in answer to the life of Jesus Christ.”23  It comes from and returns to the ultimate, Jesus 
Christ, but it does so by way of the penultimate.  We are responsible before Christ for those 
aspects of the penultimate that have been entrusted to our care.  This is why Bonhoeffer can say 
that “The attention of responsible people is directed to concrete neighbors in their concrete 
reality.”24  We are called by Christ to exercise responsible care for those aspects of the 
penultimate within our purview.   
Lest this responsibility seem overwhelming, it is balanced by freedom.  As with 
responsibility, freedom comes from and returns to the ultimate by way of the penultimate.  
Because of the reconciliation wrought by Jesus Christ, Christians are freed from all else that 
would claim the right to judge their actions.  Not even the conscience, Bonhoeffer tells us, 
retains such a position: “Jesus Christ is the one who sets the conscience free for the service of 
God and neighbor.”25  In the wake of Christ’s reconciling work, it is only Christ who judges our 
action.  Christians are freed from the necessity of self-justification by means of any penultimate 
authority, freed to carry on with living in accordance to their responsibility for those aspects of 
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the penultimate entrusted to their care.  It is in this way that “Responsibility and freedom are 
mutually corresponding concepts;”26 we are freed by Christ from the need to seek justification in 
the penultimate for the actions that we undertake in caring responsibility for the penultimate.   
The result of this coupling of freedom and responsibility is a movement in 
Christian ethics beyond “an ultimately dependable knowledge of good and evil.”27  Because the 
Christian stands reconciled with God, the question that arises when faced with the need to act 
with free responsibility toward the penultimate is not whether a proposed course of action is 
morally good or evil, but whether that proposed course of action is better or worse for those it 
intends to serve.  Our justification being settled in Christ, the only pertinent question that 
remains is this: Which course of action is better for my neighbor, on whose behalf I propose to 
act?  One who acts in freedom and responsibility, Bonhoeffer writes, “dares to act and leaves the 
judgment about good and evil up to God.”28  
All this does not mean that Bonhoeffer descends into antinomianism.  He 
recognizes that the law of God revealed in the Decalogue and in the divine mandates – which 
will be discussed further in due course – establish a “boundary for any responsible action.”29  
This is a serious consideration, but one that Bonhoeffer ultimately subordinates to Jesus Christ, 
who is “the ultimate reality to whom [responsible activity] is responsible.”30  Law finally gives 
way to gospel, or better, the law and its giver and not separated.  While the Law is invaluable for 
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establishing general guidelines for exercising responsible care of the penultimate, situations may 
arise where care for the penultimate can only be exercised in violation of the law.  But, in such a 
case, we have not a rejection of the law but an “act of breaking the law to sanctify it,” or a 
“suspension of the law” that “serve[s] its true fulfillment.”31 
At this point the following question might be raised: How do Christians become 
the sort of people who act in this freely responsible way?  It is largely to answer such a question 
that Bonhoeffer writes his essay on “Ethics as Formation.”  The idea here is that Christians are to 
assume the form of Jesus Christ or, better, that Christ takes form in Christians and the church.  
As Bonhoeffer says in no uncertain terms, “‘Formation’ means…Jesus Christ taking form in 
Christ’s church.”32  This taking form of Jesus Christ in the church does not mean that Christians 
become repetitions or exact imitations of Christ.  Even less does it mean that humans become 
ontologically divine.  Rather, it means that church and Christians develop patterns of free and 
responsible activity in relation to the world that reflect – in their own capacity and context – the 
tri-fold form of Jesus Christ as incarnate, crucified, and resurrected.   
It is here that the mandates, which Bonhoeffer introduces in the essay “Christ, 
Reality, and Good” but which appear throughout the Ethics, have a significant role to play.  The 
divine mandates are work, marriage or family, government, and church.  Bonhoeffer insists that 
these mandates do not exist independent of Jesus Christ, and thus do not provide the basis for 
some sort of naturally derived ethics.  Indeed, they “are divine…only because of their original 
and final relation to Christ.”33  Still, their rather traditionalist appearance can easily raise 
questions as to the ultimate veracity of Bonhoeffer’s claim.  Two points can be argued briefly 
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against this interpretation.  First, the source of Bonhoeffer’s mandates is Scripture and not an 
empirical or generalizing study of nature.  Bonhoeffer is clear about this when he introduces the 
mandates, noting that “scripture names four…mandates.”34  Second, no less an authority on the 
avoidance of natural theology than Karl Barth finds no reason to reject Bonhoeffer’s own 
understanding of the mandates as revealed.  The mandates “do not emerge from reality,” Barth 
says, “they descend into it.”35 
The mandates are properly understood as, and Rasmussen gets this right, “the 
media of conformation.”36  They are conceptual designations for webs of relationship wherein 
Christians are called to live in free responsibility by being conformed to Christ.  Furthermore, 
each of these webs of relationship presents one with a specific set of responsibilities.  For 
instance, the mandate of marriage or family presents the responsibilities of parent to child, child 
to parent, and of spouse to spouse, while the mandate of government presents the responsibility 
of governor to citizen, officer of the law to criminal, etc.  It is here also that we recognize that 
responsibility is a product of relationship.  Each mandate, then, as a web of relationship that 
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presents us with specific responsibilities, provides a concrete context for asking the question of 
“how Christ may take form among us today and here.”37 
 
SELF-INFLICTED DEATH: BONHOEFFER’S ETHIC IN ACTION  
Thinking of the development of Bonhoeffer’s ethical though, Rasmussen notes that, in the 
portions of the Ethics that deal with particular ethical questions, “the method of deciding, still 
done contextually, takes the form of something approaching casuistic reasoning.”38  If by 
‘casuistic reasoning’ Rasmussen means a general process of deliberation and discernment 
concerned with ascertaining what the best response might be to a particular situation, then he 
would be correct.  But, this is highly unlikely given the technical nature of the term and the 
conceptual distinction that Rasmussen himself implies between a more mundane ‘method of 
deciding’ and casuistry, which is generally defined as a way of negotiating the conflict of 
abstract moral principles as they apply in a particular situation.39  The following consideration of 
Bonhoeffer’s treatment of self-inflicted death will argue that the application of abstract moral 
principles is far from Bonhoeffer’s mind as he turns from his more theoretical material to the 
consideration of particular ethical issues.   
 Bonhoeffer most extensively engages in reflection on particular ethical question 
in his essay entitled, “Natural Life.”  Three features of this essay lend themselves to easy 
misinterpretation by those who, like Rasmussen, are inclined to find casuistry in Bonhoeffer.  
First, while the term ‘natural’ has negative connotations for many due to the castigation of 
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natural theology by Karl Barth, Bonhoeffer speaks of the ‘natural’ as the state of creation after 
the Fall insofar as it is “directed toward the coming of Jesus Christ.”40  That is, the natural is that 
condition of creation after the Fall whereby God preserves its being in the face of sin for the sake 
of God’s saving will.  In this, Bonhoeffer treats the natural in relation to Christ must as he does 
the relation between ultimate and penultimate.  This connection becomes explicit when he write, 
“Only in Christ’s becoming human does natural life become the penultimate that is directed 
toward the ultimate.”41  That is to say, it is because of God’s saving work in Jesus Christ that 
creaturely existence is preserved in the wake of sin and, as it is preserved, it serves that saving 
work.   
 This leads to the second point that could imply casuistry when misinterpreted, 
namely, the place that Bonhoeffer assigns to reason in the knowledge of the natural.  Reason is 
the organ by which the natural is known.  Two caveats must be made to understand this rightly.  
On the one hand, Bonhoeffer is perfectly clear that reason is a fallen, creaturely reality that is 
“completely embedded in the natural” and “is not a divine principle of cognition…superior to the 
natural.”42  On the other hand, that which reason knows – the natural – is nothing more (or less) 
than the created order as it is preserved in the face of sin.  That is, what reason knows is the 
existence of the world and that which supports the continuation of this existence, and what 
reason knows in light of Christ is that God wills the continuation of this existence for the sake of 
God’s salvific work.   
 All this leads to the third point that could imply casuistry when misinterpreted, 
namely, the emphasis that Bonhoeffer places on the right to bodily life.  It is this right that guides 
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Bonhoeffer’s thinking through the particular ethical questions addressed here.  The important 
point is that this right to bodily life is not an abstract principle of the sort that could lead to 
casuistry.  Though bodily life is known by reason as integral to the existence of the world, it is 
only in light of Christ that one can speak of a right to bodily life.  As Bonhoeffer presents the 
logic, “Since by God’s will human life on earth exists only as bodily life, the body has a right to 
be preserved.”43  The right to bodily life is not, then, an abstract principle but a commitment 
based in the relation of the penultimate to the ultimate as demonstrated in Jesus Christ.   
 When these three aspects are properly understood, one is not inclined to conclude 
that Bonhoeffer lapses into casuistry in his treatment of particular ethical questions.  All three of 
the aspects discussed above that could lead in this direction when misinterpreted are actually 
grounded firmly in Christ.  This opinion is strengthened by an examination of Bonhoeffer’s 
particular treatments, especially by his treatment of self-inflicted death.  Bonhoeffer begins with 
a point ascertained from reason, namely, that humans are distinct from other non-human animals 
in that they are capable of “voluntarily bring[ing] death upon themselves.”44  It is this freedom 
with relation to bodily life that establishes it as human life, for without it there would be no 
freedom for God in the sacrifice of life.  Thus, it is on the basis of a penultimate point, 
ascertained from reason, that Bonhoeffer is lead to a consideration of the ultimate wherein he 
provides a theological interpretation of self-inflicted death.   
 Bonhoeffer makes a fundamental distinction between self-inflicted death as 
sacrifice – such as in giving up space in the lifeboat of a sinking ship or in using “one’s own 
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body to shield the body of a friend from a bullet”45 – and self-inflicted death as self-murder.  The 
former is, from Bonhoeffer’s Christian perspective, an acceptable actualization of the Christian’s 
free responsibility before God to serve.  Although he does not explicitly make the connection, it 
is likely that this is such an easy move for Bonhoeffer to make not only because it is in keeping 
with the weight of Christian tradition on the subject, but because in Christ’s entire life and 
especially in his crucifixion we find the quintessential example of such self-sacrifice.  It is, after 
all, the form of Christ that Christians are called to assume.   
 Self-murder, on the other hand, is defined as self-inflicted death where “a person 
acts exclusively and consciously out of personal self-interest.”46  As opposed to the case of self-
sacrifice where one’s life of free responsibility before God and in service of neighbor 
necessitates laying down that life for the benefit of others, Bonhoeffer understands self-murder 
as an attempt at usurpation of God’s right over the end of human life.  It is, as such, “the ultimate 
and extreme self-justification of the human being as human,” “the sin of unbelief,” and “the 
epitome of sin.”47  But, Bonhoeffer admits, such a claim can only be made from the perspective 
of the ultimate.  Seen from the vantage of the penultimate alone, there is no compelling reason 
why such self-murder ought to be condemned.  A penultimate construction of the right to bodily 
life is helpless here for, if that right is not grounded in God, it depends only on the fact that the 
individual possesses it.  Who is to say that the individual cannot surrender this right?   
 One further and important nuance is included in Bonhoeffer’s treatment.  This 
nuance in particular shows him to be deeply engaged with the penultimate concerns surrounding 
self-inflicted death.  For, as soon as he defines self-murder as self-inflicted death arising from 
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exclusive and conscious self-interest, he hastens to add, “But who would dare to speak with 
certainty about this exclusivity and this consciousness?”48  Bonhoeffer is alive and sensitive to 
the uncertainties and complexities of penultimate life and, while he is clear that selfishly 
motivated self-inflicted death falls outside the bounds of that action expected in light of the 
ultimate, he refuses to pass judgment on those who succumb to what he sees as the very real 
temptation to this terrifyingly final act.  “[W]ho would say,” he asks, “that under this most sever 
temptation the grace of God cannot embrace and bear even failure?”49  
 In light of all this, it seems clear that Bonhoeffer is not engaged in casuistry when 
it comes to addressing particular ethical questions.  Rather, and this is of vital import, both his 
answers to these questions and the framework within which he answers them are directly related 
to his more theoretical considerations.  At every point he seeks to understand the penultimate as 
penultimate, that is, in light of the ultimate found in Jesus Christ.  And, at every point, he seeks 
to discern how a Christian might act within a particular context with free responsibility before 
God and for neighbor in a manner that corresponds to the form of Jesus Christ.  
 
RECAPITULATION: BONHOEFFER’S TWO-FOLD CONTEXTUALISM 
Having now spent considerable time with Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, it is fitting to pause briefly and 
consider what type of ethics we are here presented with.  Palmer divides the field of normative 
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ethics into two camps, the deontological and the teleological.50  The former is concerned with an 
act as such and how it succeeds or fails in corresponding to a universal standard of the morally 
right or good, while the latter considers an action in terms of its consequences.  Bonhoeffer 
consistently rejects both of these approaches, doing so programmatically early in the Ethics’ first 
essay, “Christ, Reality, and Good:” “The question of good must not be narrowed to investigating 
the relation of actions to their motives, or to their consequences, measuring them by a readymade 
ethical standard.”51  The reference to consequentialism is clear while that to deontology is veiled 
behind the language of motive.  This language is an allusion to Immanuel Kant, deontologist 
extraordinaire, who made much of the importance of a will that is good “not because of what it 
performs or effects,” that is, in terms of consequences resulting from the will’s activity, “[but] is 
good in itself.”52  Further, Bonhoeffer cannot be characterized as a natural lawyer for, as we have 
seen, his mandates are not given by nature.  Nor does his work finally fit within the realm of 
virtue ethics, despite his discussion of formation, because the acquisition and possession of 
virtue is not his goal.   
 H. Richard Niebuhr’s analysis brings us closer to characterizing Bonhoeffer.  
Conceptually re-describing teleological ethics as ‘man-as-maker’ and deontological ethics as 
‘man-the-citizen,’ he introduces the concept of responsibility – an important notion for 
Bonhoeffer, as previously discussed – and sets about thinking of ‘man-the-answerer.’  
Understanding the moral life in terms of responsibility is to think of “an agent’s action as 
response to an action upon him in accordance with his interpretation of the latter action and with 
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his expectation of response to his response; and all of this is in a continuing community of 
agents.”53  What Niebuhr provides here is a way of thinking about a contextual ethic, that is, an 
ethic concerned with the concrete context in which a moral agent is encountered with a demand 
for action, with the resources said agent has for choosing and pursuing a course of action, and 
with the community to which said agent is accountable.  It is clear that Bonhoeffer’s ethical 
thought is closest to this contextual line.  But, if Bonhoeffer’s is a contextual ethic, what sort of 
contextual ethic is it? 
 The contextualism of Bonhoeffer’s thought can be described as a two-fold 
contextualism, and it is here that the numerous resources at Bonhoeffer’s disposal for the 
adjudication between different Christian ethical proposals can be seen, against Rasmussen’s 
position encountered in the opening portion of this paper.  First, there is the contextualism of the 
ultimate.  Bonhoeffer is interested in bringing his theology and theological identity to bear on his 
context, and it is a particular theology and theological identity that he brings to bear.  It is this 
particularism that constitutes the contextualism of the ultimate in his ethical thought.  
Bonhoeffer’s conceptual tools – such as the divine mandates, the life of free responsibility before 
God and for neighbor, and the tri-fold form of Christ that is to take form in the lives of church 
and Christian – are all a part of this contextual aspect.  Consequently, theological argumentation 
surrounding these and other aspects of Bonhoeffer’s contextualism of the ultimate provide tools 
for adjudicating between competing Christian ethical proposals.  For instance, it means 
something to Christian ethics if Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the tri-fold form of Christ is 
correct.  This is a theological argument that has direct relevance for ethical thinking.  In this way 
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we see that the entire scope of theological inquiry has become, within Bonhoeffer’s ethical 
thought, a field of contest for adjudicating between competing ethical claims.   
 Second, there is the contextualism of the penultimate.  Bonhoeffer’s ethical 
thought is not interested in questions of good and evil absolutely conceived.  Because of the 
reconciliation between God and humanity achieved in Jesus Christ, such questions of self-
justification must be sidelined.  The question that matters as church and Christian prepare to act 
in free responsibility is whether or not a proposed action will serve the preservation of the 
penultimate and its preparation for the ultimate, that is, whether a proposed action “helps my 
neighbor to be a human being before God.”54  It is here that sensitivity to the penultimate context 
is vitally important, for one must be able to ascertain whether an action will have the desired 
effect.  Thus, engagement with the whole of penultimate sociological, political, economic, 
psychological, and any otherwise characterized inquiry is required.  Furthermore, because such 
inquiry is required, it presents an expansive field for adjudication between ethical proposals as 
the potential effects of these competing proposals are ascertained and weighed.  In many 
respects, the expansiveness of this field is almost crippling, and it may very well have been 
recognition of this breadth that lead Bonhoeffer to emphasize that we must finally act in free 
responsibility, leaving the final judgment of our action to God.   
The important thing to note here, however, is that such pragmatic considerations 
are not additions to Bonhoeffer’s thought meant to plug practical holes that his more theoretical 
thought – grounded theologically in Christ – is unable to address.  That they are such superfluous 
additions is Rasmussen’s contention, saying that such considerations do not “have any necessary 
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methodological connection to [Bonhoeffer’s] christological ethics.”55  The ability to make such a 
statement suggests that Rasmussen has seriously misunderstood Bonhoeffer’s thought in the 
Ethics.  It is precisely Bonhoeffer’s christology that leads him to engagement with the world, and 
it is again this ultimate in Jesus Christ that frees him for such engagement.  As Ziegler rightly 
discerns concerning Bonhoeffer thought on this point, “There is freedom to be about the 
penultimate and worldly things of human life, not in spite of what is ultimate, but because of it 
and for its sake.”56  
 
CONCLUSION 
In the volume wherein he charges that the core commitments of Bonhoeffer’s ethical thought 
provide no basis for adjudicating between various Christian ethical proposals, Rasmussen’s focus 
is on Bonhoeffer’s involvement in the Abwehr resistance to Hitler.  It is likely that this single-
minded focus lead to a distortion in Rasmussen’s understanding of Bonhoeffer, for Bonhoeffer’s 
resistance work was only one of two motivations that lay behind his work in the Ethics.  It is 
Bonhoeffer’s other motivation, namely, “his desire to contribute to the reconstruction of life in 
Germany and the West in the peace that would follow the war,”57 that this paper has endeavored 
to bring to the fore.   
The paradigm of ethical thought that emerges from such a reading is one that 
allows and compels the Christian to act in free responsibility before God and in service of the 
neighbor, within the context of the relationships conceptually organized by the divine mandates, 
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for the preservation of the penultimate and its preparation for the ultimate, and in correspondence 
with the tri-fold form of Christ.  Such an ethical paradigm is characterized, this paper has argued, 
by a two-fold contextualism that seeks to bring a particular understanding of the ultimate to bear 
on a particular situation within penultimate existence with the goal of benefiting that existence.  
In this way, the whole scope of theological inquiry and the whole scope of inquiry about the 
penultimate world – including sociological, political, economic, psychological, or any otherwise 
characterized inquiry – provide fields of contest for adjudication between disparate and 
contradictory Christian ethical proposals.   
It is certainly true that Bonhoeffer envisages “extraordinary situation[s]” and 
“borderline cases”58 where actions that contradict the usual guidelines within both ultimate (i.e., 
the Decalogue) and penultimate (i.e., civil law) contexts must be ventured.  The existence of 
such cases, and the necessity of such action, results from a disorder in the penultimate situation 
and not from a disorder in the ultimate.  Such actions truly are a last resort, required when the 
penultimate threatens its own preservation.  In such a situation, church and Christian may find 
that they are called to act against the penultimate for the sake of the penultimate.  But, even here, 
ethical action is undertaken in free responsibility before God and in service of the neighbor, 
within the context of the relationships conceptually organized by the divine mandates, for the 
preservation of the penultimate and its preparation for the ultimate, and in correspondence with 
the tri-fold form of Christ. 
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